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SIGURJ6NssoN V. ICELAND: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS EXPANDS THE NEGATiVE RIGHT OF AssoCIATION
W. Kearns Davis, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCrION
In the late 1940s, with the horrible echoes of the Second World
War still ringing in their ears, the leaders of Western Europe decided that
the road to lasting peace lay in unity among nations.' In May 1949 they
created the Council of Europe (Council), the first international political
institution in Europe.2 Although the United Nations already had passed
its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),3 the
Council feared that the U.N. would take too long to implement an
effective system of enforcement.4 The Council began immediately, there-
fore, to formulate its own agreement, modeled after the Universal Decla-
ration, but supported by authoritative machinery.5
On November 4, 1950, in Rome, representatives of fifteen nations
signed the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).6 In
' Law Clerk to the Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Em, Chief Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. B.A. 1991, Davidson College; M.A. 1994, Duke
University; J.D. 1995, University of North Carolina. I wrote this Article in the course
of my graduate studies at Duke University. I would like to thank Warren Lemer,
Professor of History, and Dianne Sasson, Director of the Master of Arts in Liberal
Studies Program, for their helpful comments on the original draft.
I THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (1992) [hereinafter THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also INGRID DETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 116-17
(1994); Brian Walsh, Protecting Citizens from Their Own Countries: How the European
Court of Human Rights Affects Domestic Laws and Personal Liberties, 15 HUM. RTs.
20, 20 (1988) (stating that the Convention "originated from the experiences of World
War I').
2 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5.
' The Declaration was adopted in 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A(1ll), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
4 Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accom-
plishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1988).
5 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5.
6 Id. at 7. The official title of the treaty is the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1993). For a thorough discussion of the history
and development of the Convention and its institutions, see J.A. Andrews, The Euro-
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1959, the Council established the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, France,7 making the Convention the first international human
rights agreement with a means of enforcing the rights it guarantees! The
hopes of the Convention's framers for effective enforcement have been
realized, for the nations of Europe faithfully obey the verdicts of the
Court in cases in which they are parties.9 Moreover, in the forty-four
years since the Convention was enacted, the number of countries accept-
ing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has doubled to a total of
thirty nations, including several former members of the Communist
Bloc.'" As a result, the power of the Court to affect the lives of in-
dividuals is now immense.
Despite its roots in the aftermath of the Second World War, the
scope of the Convention is not limited to protection from violent
atrocities. Article 11 of the Convention expressly guarantees the right of
individuals to associate freely, and specifically includes trade unions
pean Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463 (1984).
Daniel S. Sullivan, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the
Necessary Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L.J. 2369, 2374 (1993).
Andrews, supra note 6, at 468.
9 Richard S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority
of Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 217 (1993); Buergenthal, supra note 4, at 15; cf.
Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and Comparative Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1431
(1985) (referring to the United Kingdom's obligation to change its union security
system following the Court's decision in Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1981)). The limiting phrase "in cases in which they are parties" is an impor-
tant one, for the precedential effect of Court decisions on nonparties has been less
pervasive. Some countries, such as Austria, attribute constitutional authority to the
Convention in their domestic systems. Andrews, supra note 6, at 480. In others,
however, including the United Kingdom, domestic courts are not bound by the
Convention or the decisions of the Court, so an individual seeking relief under the
Convention must do so directly through the Commission and the Court. Id. at 480-81.
English courts may consider the Convention when there is no clear answer under
English law. Id. at 481.
For a comprehensive study of the history, protections, and institutions of the
Convention, see THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (R.
St. J. Macdonald et al., 1993) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SYSTEM].
'o COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS, DECLARATIONS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 25 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, October 17, 1994. The countries now
governed by the Convention are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Ma-
rino, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. Id.
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among the types of associations that it contemplates." The Convention
does not, however, expressly guarantee the freedom to refrain from
associating. 2 The Court recently addressed the issue of whether such a
"'negative' freedom of association"'13 is to be inferred from the express
language of Article 11.14 Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland arose when Sigurdur A.
Sigurj6nsson, a Reykjavic taxi driver, was stripped by the government of
his taxi license for failure to pay union dues. After an unsuccessful
constitutional challenge of Iceland's licensing statute, Sigurj6nsson sought
international relief under the Convention. 6 A divided court held that
Article 11 implicitly guarantees the freedom of an individual not to be
compelled to associate with others against his will.
This Article first discusses the facts of Sigurj6nsson and the compet-
ing analyses of the majority and dissent. 8 It then discusses the law and
practice of compulsory association under the domestic law of Europe, and
tracks the development of the Article 11 negative right of association
from its adoption in 1951 through the jurisprudence that immediately
preceded Sigurjdnsson.9 Next, the Article critiques the Court's reasoning
and interpretation of Article 11 in light of that prior jurisprudence, and
predicts the effect of its holding on European employment practices.'
Finally, this Article concludes that while the judgment of the Court was
justified on the facts of the case, its expansive legal conclusions over-
stepped the bounds of both the Article itself and the Court's precedent.2'
II. SIGURJ6NSSON V. ICELAND
The facts of Sigurjdnsson are straightforward. On October 24, 1984,
Sigurj6nsson obtained a license to operate a taxi.' The license was
issued on the condition that Sigurj6nsson join the Frami Automobile
Association (Frami).' He did so, and paid membership fees until Au-
" European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights]. For the full text of Article 11, see infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
22 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 11.
,3 Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1993).
,4 Id. at 14.
"S Id. at 8-9.
26 Id. at 9, 12.
17 Id. at 15.
28 See infra notes 22-74 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 75-136 and accompanying text.
o See infra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
" Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1993).
" Id. Iceland Regulation no. 320/1983 was issued by the Iceland Minister of
1995]
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gust, 1985. After Sigurj6nsson stopped paying his Frami dues, Frami
requested that the licensing agency revoke his license.' The agency re-
voked the license on June 30, 19 86 , 2s and Sigurj6nsson sent a letter of
protest to the Ministry of Transport.' The Ministry of Transport con-
frmed the revocation, and sent a copy of the confirmation to the Reykja-
vik Chief of Police.' Sigurj6nsson's attorney informed the police that
Sigurj6nsson intended to contest the revocation in court, and asked them
not to interfere with his taxi business.29 Despite his request, on August
1, 1986, the police stopped Sigurj6nsson and removed his taxi license
plates.30
Sigurj6nsson filed suit against the licensing agency and the Ministry
of Transport in the Civil Court of Reykjavik, seeking a declaration that
Article 73 of the Iceland Constitution prevents the government from
compelling an individual to belong to a particular association.3' The
Supreme Court of Iceland, in a decision issued on December 15, 1988,
agreed with the lower court that the Iceland Constitution does not guaran-
tee a negative right of association.32 However, it reversed the judgment
of the lower court on the ground that there was no statutory basis for the
regulatory provision requiring membership in Frami.33
Althing, the Icelandic Parliament, responded quickly to the Supreme
Court's ruling. Law No. 77/1989, which went into effect on July 1, 1989,
made taxi licenses conditional on union membership. 4 In response to the
Transport pursuant to Iceland Law no. 36/1970, art. 10. Id.
Frami was formed by professional drivers in 1936. Id. at 11. The government does
not control its policies. Id. Its expressed purpose is:
(1) to protect the professional interests of its members and promote solidarity among
professional taxicab drivers;
(2) to determine, negotiate and present demands relating to working hours, wages and
rates of its members;
(3) to seek to maintain limitations on the number of taxicabs and
(4) to represent its members before the public authorities.
Id. (citing Frami Articles cl. 2).
24 Id. at 9.
2 Id.
26 Id.
2 id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
304 [V/ol. 27:301
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new statute, Sigurj6nsson wrote to Frami on July 4, 1989.15 He acknowl-
edged that he had no choice but to join the union, but emphasized "that
membership was contrary to his own wishes and interests. Not only did
Frami's Articles contain provisions contrary to his political opinions, but
the association also used the revenue from membership fees to work
against his interests."36 Furthermore, he stated that the statutory member-
ship requirement violated the Convention, and that he planned to contest
the statute accordingly.37
Sigurj6nsson filed an application with the European Commission of
Human Rights (Commission),38 claiming that the obligation to join Frami
violated Article 11 of the Convention. 9 Iceland's government argued in
35Id.
36 Id.
3 Id.
3' All claims under the Convention must be filed with the Commission, which has
sole authority to determine whether a case is admissible for review under the Conven-
tion. Nanette Dumas, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An International Human
Rights Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 585, 604
(1990). If the Commission admits a case and issues a decision thereon, within three
months thereafter the case may be appealed to the Court by one of the states involved
or by the Commission itself. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra
note 11, art. 32, § 1, art. 47; see also Leslie R. Strauss, Note, Press Licensing Violates
Freedom of Expression-Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law
for the Practice of Journalism, 5 Inter-Am. Ct. HR. (Ser. A) (1986), 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 891, 899-900 (1987).
31 Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1993). Siguj6nsson
also claimed, in the alternative, violations of Articles 9, 10, and 13. Id. The Commis-
sion found it unnecessary to reach the claims under Articles 9 and 10. Id. at 30.
Article 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights provides:
"[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." Id. Unlike the
U.S. Constitution, the Convention does not contain a "case and controversy" require-
ment. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 11. Because
Sigurj6nsson complied with Althing's new statute while he was pursuing his claim
under the Convention he was never prosecuted under the statute he was contesting. See
supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Although it allowed him to pursue his claim
under Article 11, the Commission held that Article 13 does not guarantee a remedy
when the statute in question has not been enforced against the complainant.
Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30. The Commission explained that "in
such circumstances a remedy would in effect amount to some sort of judicial review
of legislation." Id. In effect, it limited the relief available to Sigurj6nsson to a declara-
tion that Iceland's statute violated Article 11. Because the Article 13 decision is periph-
eral to the substantive Article 11 claim, this Article does not analyze it further.
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defense that the failure of the Convention's signatories to adopt an
express guarantee of a negative freedom of association indicates that they
intended to leave that question to domestic lawmakers.' The Com-
mission agreed with Sigurj6nsson, concluding that Iceland's statute
violated Article 11.41
To reach its conclusion, the Commission addressed separately the
two paragraphs of Article 11. It held first that paragraph 1, despite
Iceland's argument, does imply a negative freedom of association.42 The
Commission declined to decide, however, whether that negative freedom
is equal in strength to the expressed positive right.43 Instead, it limited
its holding to the particular circumstances of the case, stressing its
reliance on the degree of compulsion to join the union." A negative
right of association must be inferred from Article 11 where the degree of
compulsion to join a particular group is so severe that it undermines the
freedom of choice that Article 11 was intended to protect.45
Turning to paragraph 2 of Article 11, the Commission focused on
whether compulsory membership in Frami was "necessary in a democratic
society."' Citing the judgment of the Court in Young v. United King-
dom,47 it used three principles to conduct that inquiry:
Firstly, "necessary" in this context does not have the flexibility of such
expressions as "useful" or "desirable." Secondly, in a "democratic
society" tolerance and broadmindedness require that a balance must be
struck which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and
avoids any abuse of a dominant position. Thirdly, any restriction im-
posed on a Convention right must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.'
Sigurj6nsson argued that the statute in question did not specify the
purposes of Frami, and that Frami therefore was free to decide its own
40 Sigurj6nsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
4, Id. at 29.
42 Id. at 26-27.
41 Id. at 26.
4 Id. ("A threat of losing the taxicab licence, involving the loss of livelihood, is
a very serious form of compulsion to join a particular trade union.").
41 Id. at 26-27.
' Id. at 27 (quoting Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 11,
art. 11, 91 2).
"7 Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
Sigurj6nsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (citing Young v. United Kingdom,
44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981)).
306 [Vol. 27:301
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purposes and to act against his political interests.' An association cannot
be considered necessary to fulfill a government purpose, he contended,
when the government has no control over the purposes of the associa-
tion5 Iceland responded that, despite the lack of a purpose expressed in
the statute, Frami fulfilled the dual governmental aims of protecting its
members' interests and supervising their provision of services to the pub-
lic.51
The Commission held that compulsory membership in Frami was not
necessary, and, therefore, that the infringement of Sigurj6nsson's rights
under Article 11, paragraph 1 was not justified under paragraph 2.52 It
rejected the claim that Frami served a necessary supervisory purpose,
pointing out that the legislature had created a separate, public-law institu-
tion-the Committee for Taxicab Supervision-for the same purpose.53
Finally, it denied that compulsory membership was necessary to enable
Frami to protect the interests of its members. 4 After issuing its decision,
the Commission referred the case to the Court.55
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Commission by a vote of
eight to one.56 In doing so, it took a subtle but significant legal step that
the Commission had been unwilling to take. Like the Commission, the
Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the negative freedom of
association that it recognized in Article 11 "is to be considered on equal
footing with the positive right."'57 However, the Court based its finding
on footing more solid than that of the Commission. Whereas the Com-
mission ultimately had based its decision on infringement of the freedom
protected by the positive right," the Court found that the negative free-
dom, albeit implied, existed apart from any infringement of the expressed
positive right.5 The Court found, in other international treaties and in
the domestic law of the majority of the Convention's signatories, common
agreement that workers should be entitled to a negative freedom of
41 Id. at 25, 27.
-' See id. at 27.
51 Id. at 28.
52 Id. at 28-29.
' Id. (citing Iceland Law no. 77/1989, § 10). Public-law institutions, the Commis-
sion noted, are not subject to the limitations of Article 11. Id. at 28 (citing Le Compte
v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-27 (1981)).
I d. at 28-29.
5 Id. at 6.
6 See id. at 15-16.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 25.
59 See id. at 15-16.
30719951
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association. 6 In light of that international "common ground,"61 and
because "the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted
in light of present-day conditions,"62 "Article 11 must be viewed as
encompassing a negative right of association."63
Judge Th6r Vilhjdlmsson dissented, refusing to infer a negative right:
"the text of this Article cannot be construed as guaranteeing the so-called
negative freedom of association. Its text makes no express reference to
such a guarantee."' To support his textual argument, he cited evidence
that the omission of an express negative right of association was inten-
tional.'
First, he contended, the Court was misguided in relying on the U.N.
Universal Declaration,' because the preamble to the Convention made
clear that its framers intended only selective incorporation of the rights
included in the Universal Declaration.67 More importantly, he noted, the
travaux prdparatoires" make clear that the Convention's framers con-
sidered and rejected the inclusion in Article 11 of a provision guarantee-
ing a negative freedom of association.69
Turning from his initial emphasis on the text of Article 11, Judge
Vilhjdlmsson next addressed the Court's determination that, "in light of
present-day conditions,"70 the Article can be read to imply a negative
right.7' He argued that positive and negative rights of association are too
distinct in their meanings and effects for the granting of one to imply the
granting of the other. Positive freedom of association, he stated, "was
originally one of the foundations of political freedom and activity."'  He
asserted that trade unions, and thus the issues of negative freedom of
association that are at issue in Sigurj6nsson, developed later, and that
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. (citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989)).
63 Id.
'4 Id. at 21-22 (VilhjfImsson, J., dissenting).
65 Id.
6 Compare id. with Sigurj6nsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (citing Uni-
versal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 20, § 2 (1948) (expressly establishing a negative
freedom of association).
67 Id. at 21-22 (Vilhjdlmsson, J., dissenting).
6 The traveaux priparatoires is the Convention's equivalent to legislative history.
9 Id.
70 See id. at 16 (citing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
40 (1989)); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
I' d. at 21-22 (Vilhj/dmsson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Vilhjd1msson, J., dissenting).
3 Id. (Vilhjfimsson, J., dissenting).
308 ('Vol. 27:301
SIGURJ6NSSON v. ICELAND
cases like Sigurjdnsson demonstrate that the negative freedom may not
further citizens' interests as substantially as the positive right. "T]he
negative freedom is so special and so clearly distinguishable from the
positive freedom of association, that a legal interpretation of the Article
cannot result in the inclusion of the negative freedom within its sphere of
application."74
Il1. COMPULSORY UNIONISM IN EUROPE
Labor unions historically have been plagued by "free
riders"--workers who accept the benefits of unions' negotiations for better
working conditions, but who refuse to join unions to avoid paying union
dues.75 To alleviate the problem, some countries have permitted employ-
ers and unions to enter into "closed shop" agreements, under which
employers may hire only union members.76 Similar "union-shop" agree-
ments, under which employees must join the union within a certain period
after beginning work, are adopted frequently in the United States, where
Congress has expressly authorized them.'
Unions in Europe are much different in character from unions in the
United States. The predominant factors that induce European workers to
join together in unions generally are not employment interests, but
common political or religious ideologies.78 In most of Europe, therefore,
it is rare that a single union is granted the right to be the exclusive
bargaining representative for the workers of a particular employer,79
I d. (Vilhjfimsson, J., dissenting).
7S See LAMMY BETEN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 76 (1993); cf. International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64 n.14 (1961) (discussing the free-
rider problem in the United States).
76 BaTTEN, supra note 75, at 76.
" See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87
(1988 & Supps. I-V 1989-93); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
" Maya R. Crone, Remaking Procrustes's Bed: A Model for Non-Exclusive Labor
Law, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 243, 262, n. 94 (1992). See Telephone Interview
with Edward Yemin, Chief of Labor Relations Branch, International Labour Organi-
zation (November 1, 1994).
" In the U.S., by contrast, "[e]xclusivity"-the idea that the union has the sole
power to negotiate for workers in a bargaining unit--"is a fundamental premise of...
labor policy." WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., LABOR LAw 213 (3d ed. 1986); see also
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65 (1975)
(acknowledging "long and consistent adherence to the principle of exclusive representa-
tion"); DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD ET AL., CoLLECnvE BARGAINING AND LABOR AR-
BrIRATION: MATERIALS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, LABOR ARBrIRATION AND Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYmENT 27 (2d ed. 1979). For a general discussion of exclusive
representation in the United States, see Benjamin Aaron, Rights of Individual Employees
1995]
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because to designate a single union would have the effect of designating
a single ideology." Use of the closed shop is not pervasive in Europe,"'
therefore, and in some countries is outlawed altogether, 2 but it is com-
mon in certain countries such as the U.K., 3 where it has been a source
of infinite controversy."
A practice similar to the closed shop, and one that is more common
in Europe, is compulsory membership in an organization by all members
of a particular profession." In the United States, the Supreme Court has
determined that the First Amendment places limits on compulsory profes-
sional associations. 6 It held in Keller v. State Bar of California that,
although a state may compel attorneys to join a state bar, mandatory dues
may be used only to further "the State's interest in regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of legal services."" Compulsory
membership dues may not be used to "fund activities of an ideological
nature which fall outside of those areas of activity." 8 The European
Court of Human Rights has addressed the issue of compulsory profession-
al associations on multiple occasions, including Sigurj6nsson.89
Under the Act, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRIcAL APPRAISAL OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 119, 122-38 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).
0 Telephone Interview with Edward Yemin, supra note 78. See generally Crone, su-
pra note 78 (summarizing the effects of a single union in the majority of the European
nations).
"' See generally, Crone, supra note 78 (discussing a model for non-exclusive labor
law); Telephone Interview with Edward Yemin, supra note 78.
82 BETrEN, supra note 75, at 76.
8 Id.
84 Illustrative are the early 1970s. Closed shops were banned by the Industrial
Relations Act of 1971, but the Act was repealed three years later when the Labour
Party assumed power. LAMMY BETrEN, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN COMMUNrrY LAW
141 (1985).
' See, e.g., Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1993); Le Compte v.
Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1981). But cf. Telephone Interview with Mr.
Giuseppe Casale, European Regional Office, International Labour Organization (Novem-
ber 2, 1994) (explaining that even such professional organizations generally are volun-
tary).
Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
89 Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8.
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IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO SIGURJONSSON
Article 11 provides in full:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to
join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
(2) No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of
these rights by merbers of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the state."
During the last two decades the Court has refined significantly its
Article 11 labor jurisprudence.9' Of the cases decided in that period,
three are particularly important to a thorough analysis of Sigurj6nsson. In
Le Compte v. Belgium,' three physicians claimed that their rights under
Article 11 were violated by a legal requirement that they join the Belgian
medical association.93 The Court disagreed. It held that a public-law
association that a state creates to regulate a profession for the protection
of the general interest is not governed by Article ll." The Court did
' Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 11, art. 11, quoted
in Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993).
, E.g., Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§
31-37 (1976) (holding that Article 11 does apply to the state in its capacity as an
employer, but that it does not require the state to negotiate and contract with any
union with which it agrees on the substantive issues of employment); Schmidt v.
Sweden, 21 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 16-17 (1976) (holding, inter alia, that (1) Article
11 is binding on the state in its capacity as an employer whether the employee
relations in question are governed by public law or private law, (2) Article 11 does not
compel that a post-strike collective bargaining agreement include retroactivity of bene-
fits, (3) union members have a right to strike for the protection of their employment
interests, and (4) the right to strike may be regulated in some circumstances); Le
Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Young v. United Kingdom, 44
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Sibson v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1993). For discussion of Le Compte, Young and Sibson, see infra notes 94-136 and
accompanying text.
' Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
9 Id. at 26.
'4 Id. at 26-27.
1995]
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add a caveat, however. Article 11 would be violated if a compulsion to
join a public-law organization were accompanied by a prohibition against
simultaneous membership in a private association.' Having rejected the
application of Article 11 to the association in question, the Court stated
expressly that "there is no reason ... to determine whether the Conven-
tion recognises the freedom not to associate."
Three days after deciding Le Compte, a divided Court rendered its
judgment in Young v. United Kingdom.9' Young resulted from the firing
of three employees of British Rail who refused to become union mem-
bers.98 All of them had worked for British Rail for several years, but
they were dismissed when their employer agreed to a closed-shop system
that required each employee to join one of three unions.9 Opening its
discussion of Article 11, the Court noted that the parties had devoted
substantial attention to whether Article 11 guarantees a negative right of
association."° As it had done in Le Compte, however, the Court found
it unnecessary to decide that issue.'"' Nevertheless, it did not dispose of
the issue without comment. In dictum that would prove significant in
Sigurj6nsson, it elaborated on the issue at length. Even if it is assumed
that Article 11 does not directly protect the negative right of association,
the Court stated,
it does not follow that the negative aspect of a person's freedom of
association falls completely outside the ambit of Article 11 .... To
construe Article 11 as permitting every kind of compulsion in the field
of trade union membership would strike at the very substance of the
freedom it is designed to guarantee. °"
Also important are the issues that the Court did decide. While state
compulsion to join a particular union may not be sufficient by itself to
constitute an Article 11 violation, the Court held, there is interference
with workers' rights when the workers were employed before the imple-
mentation of the closed shop and are unable to practice their particular
trade elsewhere.' °3 Moreover, the Court stated, because one purpose of
freedom of association is to protect personal opinion, the guarantees of
95 Id. at 27.
6 id.
7 Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
Id. at 8.
99 Id.
1'0 Id. at 21.
0 Id. at 21-22.
,02 Id.
'03 Id. at 22-23.
312 [Vol. 27:301
SIGURJONSSON v. ICELAND
Article 11 are infringed upon when an individual is pressured to join a
union that stands for principles contrary to his own." Finding no gov-
ernment aim sufficient to justify the interference under section two of the
Article, 5 the Court concluded that the United Kingdom had violated
Article 11.L
Three opinions were filed in Young in addition to the opinion of the
Court. Although only one judge dissented,"t six judges signed a concur-
ring opinion in which they argued that Article 11 directly protects the
negative freedom of association.' 8
[A]s we understand Article 11, the negative aspect of freedom of
association is necessarily complementary to, a correlative of and in-
separable from its positive aspect. Protection of freedom of association
would be incomplete if it extended to no more than the positive aspect.
It is one and the same right that is involved.'"
,o4 Id. at 23-24.
" Id. at 24-26. The Court focused on the advantages of the closed shop that were
claimed by the U.K., including:
the fostering of orderly collective bargaining, leading to greater stability in industrial
relations; the avoidance of the proliferation of unions and the resultant trade union
anarchy; the counteracting of inequality of bargaining power, meeting the need of some
employers to negotiate with a body fully representative of the workforce; satisfying the
wish of some trade unionists not to work alongside non-union employees; ensuring that
trade union activities do not enure to the benefit of those who make no financial contri-
bution thereto.
Id. at 24-25. Interestingly, the last of those rejected reasons adopted language used by
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court consistently has held that
compulsary union membership does infringe upon workers' freedom of association under
the First Amendment, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977), and
that workers therefore can withhold union dues in the proportion that such dues are
used for political and ideological purposes. Id. at 235-36. Nevertheless, unlike the
Young Court, the Supreme Court has found that the need to prevent abuse by workers
who do not contribute financially to their unions-workers whom it calls "free riders,"
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64 n.14 (1961)-justifies
compulsory payment of dues for purposes that "may ultimately inure to the benefit" of
the workers in question. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991)
(emphasis added). For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this
area, see W. Kearns Davis, Jr., Note, Crawford v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n: The Fourth
Circuit Determines What Expenses a Union May Charge to Nonunion Workers, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 1732, 1738-44 (1994).
'" Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1981).
,o Id. at 30-32 (Sdrensen, J., dissenting).
m Id. at 28-29 (Ganshof van der Meersch, Bindschedler-Robert, Liesch, Matscher,
Pinheiro Farinha, and Pettiti, JJ., concurring).
" Id. A number of commentators agree with the concurrence. See e.g., Christian
3131995]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
Even using the majority's test, the concurrence argued, the trade union
freedom guaranteed by Article 11 is a freedom of choice, and there is no
choice in a closed-shop system."'
In his dissent, Judge Sdrensen contended that Article 11 does not
imply a negative freedom of association, even to the small degree rec-
ognized by the majority."' He based his opinion on the drafting history
of the Article,"2 which stated:
On account of the difficulties raised by the "closed shop system" in
certain countries, the Conference in this connection considered that it
was undesirable to introduce into the Convention a rule under which
'no-one may be compelled to belong to an association," which features
in the United Nations Universal Declaration." 3
In addition, he rejected the contention of the concurrence that the positive
and negative freedoms of association are "simply two sides of the same
coin...""4 The positive right, he argued, is a collective right that can be
exercised only by a group of individuals."5 The claimed negative right,
in contrast, albeit important, is an individual freedom that protects against
groups, not in favor of them, and thus is not implied by the existence of
the positive right."6 Judge S(rensen acknowledged the value of a nega-
tive right of association, but concluded that "union security arrangements
and the practice of the 'closed shop' are neither prohibited, nor authorized
by Article 11 of the Convention .... At present, it is therefore a matter
for regulation by the national law of each state.""' 7
The next major case in this area was not decided until 1993. The
Court's decision in Sibson v. United Kingdom"8 was rendered just ten
Tomuschat, Freedom of Association, in EUROPEAN SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 493, 502;
BETTEN, supra note 75, 75-76.
,,0 See Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28-29 (Ganshof van der Meersch,
Bindschedler-Robert, Liesch, Matscher, Pinheiro Farinha, and Pettiti, JI., concurring).
.. Id. at 30-32 (Sbrensen, J., dissenting).
112 Id.
"13 REPORT OF 19 JUNE 1950 OF THE CONFERENCE OF SENIOR OFFICIALs, reprinted
in 4 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVEA LX PRPPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262 (1975) [hereinafter REPORT OF 19 JUNE 1950],
quoted in Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981).
14 Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-32 (Sbrensen, J., dissenting).
115 Id.
116 Id.
17 id.
"' Sibson v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
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weeks prior to Sigurj6nsson. Sibson was a truck driver for a private
company (CNS) and the branch secretary of the Transport and General
Workers Union (TGWU)." 9 CNS was not a closed shop. 2° After be-
ig accused of misconduct in the performance of his union duties, Sibson
resigned from TGWU and joined a competing union, the United Road
Transport Union (URTU)."' TGWU members retaliated by ostracizing
him, obstructing his work, and threatening to strike if he continued to
work at the particular CNS depot." CNS tried to settle the disagree-
ment, but TGWU agreed only that it would not strike if Sibson either re-
joined TGWU or left the depot, and Sibson refused to rejoin TGWU
unless he received an apology from his accuser." CNS offered to move
Sibson to another depot less than two miles away, and told him that he
would be sent home without pay if he reported for work at the original
depot. 24 Rather than switch depots or rejoin his old union, Sibson re-
signed."
Sibson failed to obtain relief in England's courts." He claimed
before the Court that, where an individual is injured due to his failure to
join a particular union, the failure of domestic law to provide a remedy
constitutes a violation of Article 11. The Court devoted its treatment
of the issue to distinguishing Young, which it did by stressing three fac-
tors." First, it noted, that Sibson offered to rejoin TGWU if he re-
ceived an apology made clear that his objections to the union were not
rooted in specific convictions about its ideology. 29 Second, CNS was
not a closed shop.' Third, Sibson was not threatened with the loss of
his livelihood, but in fact was offered a similar position with the same
employer and in the same community.' As it had done in Young, the
Court avoided deciding whether Article 11 directly protects an
individual's negative right of association.' Instead it invoked the Young
test-whether the alleged compulsion to associate "strik[es] at the very
119 Id. at 7.
12 Id.
12 Id. at 7-8.
'2 Id. at 8.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
'2 Id. at 9-10.
127 Id. at 13.
'2 See id. at 14.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See id.
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substance of the freedom" expressly protected by Article 11 ' 33 -and
found that there was no violation.1
4
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF SIGURJ6NSSON
The Sigurjnsson majority purported to follow closely the Court's
earlier decisions in Young and Sibson.'31 Its claim is true if comparison
is limited to the facts of the cases, because those facts are very similar to
one another. 136 However, the Sigurj6nsson holding represents a major
change in the Court's conceptual treatment of the negative right of
association.
In Young, although the Court found that the employees' Article 11
rights had been violated by the compulsion to join the unions, it ex-
pressly declined to recognize an independently existing negative right of
association.'37 Instead, it found only that certain types of compulsion
effectively inhibit the positive freedom that Article 11 guarantees explicit-
ly.' 38 Although the Court arguably could have rested its Sigurj6nsson
judgment on such infringement of the positive right, as the Commission
had done,'39 it chose not to do so. By relying instead on international
"common ground," and on its own interpretation of the Convention as a
"living instrument which must be interpreted in light of present-day
conditions,""'' the Court abandoned any pretext of faithfulness to the
language of the Article and the original intent of its drafters. Therefore,
though unwilling to decide whether the implied negative right is equal in
weight to the express positive right, the Sigurj6nsson Court changed the
slope of the Article 11 playing field by obviating the need for com-
plainants to connect injuries from compulsion to associate to an infringe-
ment of the positive right.
The statement above is not intended to deemphasize the decision of
the Court to withhold judgment on the weight to be attributed to the
negative right. In Young, the Court attached great importance to the fact
that the penalty for failure to join a railroad union was not only the loss
of the opportunity to work for a particular employer, but effectively the
' Id.; Young v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-22 (1981).
134 Sibson v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1993).
,3 Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1993).
'6 Compare id. at 8-10 with Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-18 (1981) and
Sibson, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7-10.
,3' Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-22.
131 Id. at 23-24.
,31 Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-27; see supra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text.
'40 Id. at 15-16.
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loss of the freedom to practice the trade at all.' The complainants in
Le Compte also were threatened with the loss of their livelihood.42
Furthermore, in Sibson, the fact that another opportunity was available to
Sibson was a significant factor in the Court's decision that his Article 11
rights had not been violated. 43 The decision of the Sigurj6nsson Court
to recognize an independent negative right indicates that it now may be
willing to broaden the effect of that right beyond instances in which
compulsion would render the complainant unable to practice her trade.
Nevertheless, because Sigurj6nsson, like the employees in Young and Le
Compte, would have been unable to practice his profession at all if he
had refused to join Frami,'" the Court certainly left itself the option of
limiting the new negative freedom to cases in which the penalty for
failure to associate is the loss of one's livelihood.
Another way in which the impact of Sigurjdnsson may be restricted
is by applying it only when the association in question engages in
political or ideological discourse. In both Le Compte and Sigurjdnsson,
the professional organization took positions on issues not directly related
to the public purpose of regulating the profession. The Le Compte Court
held specifically that an association created by the state for the protection
of the general interest is not governed by Article 1 1.' Frami, the asso-
ciation at issue in Sigurj6nsson, was not a public-law institution," but
the Court nevertheless considered it significant that Frami's purposes were
not limited to the public interest.47 The Sigurjdnsson decision therefore
leaves the Court room to limit the ban on compulsion as the U.S. Su-
preme Court did in Keller, to cases in which the association exceeds its
authority to regulate and improve services."4
The effect of Sigurjdnsson on domestic practices will depend on the
Court's resolution of the issues raised above. An expansive application of
Sigurjdnsson might outlaw all forms of compulsory membership, including
closed shops and regulatory professional associations. A narrow applica-
tion, however, might result in no change at all.
If compulsion is prohibited only when failure to associate leaves
4 Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23.
242 See Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9 (1981).
'3 Sibson v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1993).
'4 See Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1993).
'o Le Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-27 (1981); see also
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
'14 Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13.
'4 See id. ("Frami was established under private law and enjoyed full autonomy in
determining its own aims, organisation and procedure").
"4 See also supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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employees unable to practice their trades,'49 closed shops will suffer
only minimal effects, because few closed shops are industry-wide. If
compulsion to join professional associations, which often are industry
wide, 5' is unlawful only when the organizations take ideological posi-
tions, then the organizations will be able to survive with only minor
adjustments in their activities. Which tack the Court will choose remains
to be seen. However, the fact that it could have reached its decision in
Sigurj6nsson using the precedents set in Le Compte, Young, and
Sibson,"' but chose instead to make the conceptual leap of recognizing
for the first time an independent negative right under Article 11, indicates
that the Court anticipates a broader protection against compulsory mem-
bership than it previously has recognized.
VI. CONCLUSION
By inferring an independent negative right of association from
Article 11, the Court in Sigurj6nsson made a clean break from the clear
intent of the Convention's drafters. Not only is language to support the
Court's interpretation absent from the Article, but the framers consciously
chose not to provide for a negative right of association.' Even if we
recognize the prerogative of the Court to interpret the Convention in light
of evolving international standards,' it remains difficult to justify the
Court's decision to do so in Sigurj6nsson, when it could have reached the
same result under the rules it had established in previous cases. 4
By forcing complainants to connect injuries from compulsion to
associate to an infringement of the positive right to associate, 55 the
Young rule effectively limited the scope of the negative right of associa-
tion. If the Court truly is uncertain about the effect it will give the
negative right, as its decision to reserve judgment on the issue
implies,'56 in Sigurj6nsson it inadvertently opened the door to enlarge-
ment of that right by removing the natural constraint of linkage to the
positive right. It is more likely that the opening of the door was not
'49 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
'5 See, e.g., Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1993); Le
Compte v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9 (1981).
' See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
112 REPORT OF 19 JUNE 1950, supra note 115, quoted in Young, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 21; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
... See Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1993).
154 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
156 See Sigurjdnsson, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16; see also supra note 57
and accompanying text.
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inadvertent at all, but that Sigurj6nsson signals a positive intent by the
Court to expand the scope of the negative right of association. If the
latter is true, the result may be a drastic change in the organization of
trades and professions in Europe.

